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ABSTRACT 
ELECTROMAGNETIC SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS FOR  
HARDWARE AND SOFTWARE WATERMARKING  
 
SEPTEMBER 2011 
ASHWIN LAKSHMINARASIMHAN 
 B.E., ANNA UNIVERSITY, CHENNAI, INDIA   
M.S.E.C.E., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST 
Directed by: Wayne Burleson 
 
With more and more ICs being used in sectors requiring confidentiality and 
integrity like payment systems, military, finance and health, there is a lot of concern in 
the security and privacy of ICs.  The widespread adoption of Intellectual Property (IP) 
based designs for modern systems like system on chips has reduced the time to market 
and saved a lot of money for many companies. But this has also opened the gates for 
problems like product piracy, IP theft and fraud. It is estimated that billions of dollars are 
lost annually to illegal manufacturing of Integrated Circuits. A possible solution to this 
problem of IP theft is to insert small circuits which are like unique IDs that only the 
owner or the registered verifier will know and detect in case of any conflict.  The circuits 
that are inserted are called watermarks and are in some cases kept very small so as to be 
hidden. In such cases, we would need detection schemes that work well even with very 
small watermarks. In this work, we use Electro-Magnetic (EM) based side-channels for 
the detection of watermarks. Since the 90s, Side-channel Analyses have attracted 
significant attention within the cryptographic community as they are able to obtain secret 
information from smart cards and ICs. The power side-channel analysis is a very 
vii 
 
powerful method but EM side-channels are very useful as they will not need a resistor in 
series to the power supply and just needs passive observation of the EM radiations 
emanated by the IC. This passive monitoring will be a big advantage in the case of 
automated watermark detection used by a verifier.    
In this work, we start with EM side-channel analysis on FPGA for smaller 
designs. We insert watermarks on a Microcontroller, Smartcard and an FPGA and detect 
these watermarks using EM side-channel information emanated from the Design under 
Test. We used environments with different levels of noise interference.  We compare the 
watermarking application using EM side-channels and Power side-channels in these 
different setups. These watermarks are very small and are hard to attack or remove by an 
attacker through reverse engineering or side-channel information.  Due to the robustness 
against such attacks and the easy access of EM side-channels when compared to power 
side-channels, the EM side-channel based watermarks will be a very good solution for the 
IP theft problem. EM side-channel based watermark detection supports automation which 
companies of IP cores can make use of. We also extended this work to EM Side-channel 
Trojans as the concepts are similar. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION  
 
The aspect of security to embedded systems is very important nowadays as more 
and more systems are being used in the fields which need secrecy and confidentiality, 
such as medicine, military and finance. The growing number of breaches in all the above 
fields presents unique challenges and requires utmost attention in order to prevent them. 
Security for embedded systems can sometimes be misinterpreted as only adding secure 
cryptographic algorithms which keep the key secret and mask the information in use. 
Though any embedded system would require that as a pre-requisite nowadays, there are 
more things that should be taken care of. The embedded systems should take into 
consideration issues like the possibility of attacks on the algorithms, attacks on the 
implementation methods, insider threats and property misuse.  
1.1 Watermarking 
The widespread adoption of Intellectual Property (IP) based designs for modern 
systems like system on chips have reduced the time to market and saved a lot of money 
for many companies. But this has also opened the gates for problems like product piracy, 
IP theft and fraud. This work focuses on the security aspects of an IP when a legitimate 
owner wants to protect his IP rights and make it exclusive by inserting a very small 
design which will be a unique ID or key for his IPs. This can be considered a nametag for 
the IP, which is generally kept hidden so that proving its existence can be possible by the 
owner or the verifier who has the rights to find the IP identity. This method is called 
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Watermarking and is applicable to both Hardware chips and Software codes and 
programs. To protect ASIC and FPGA chips, we would need watermarks which are 
called Hardware watermarks. We know that code theft is often possible in the case of PC 
software, and to avoid this from happening in embedded systems like microcontrollers 
and smartcards, we extend the above mentioned watermarking techniques to programs 
(software) used. In the case of smartcards, which are under attack more often than the 
other systems, the usage of software watermarks is needed. In the case of Software 
watermarks, the codes which are used for programming the smartcards are modified. The 
original code, for example the 3DES algorithm is modified to have a small portion of 
code that acts as the watermark. In order to prove one‟s ownership, one has to leak out 
this small portion of code which only the owner can know in detail.  
Watermarks can then help the original party to prove that it is his design that is 
being used by someone else when times of conflict arise. It is to make sure that the owner 
of the IC has the exclusive rights and no one else can claim ownership of this IC. For 
example, let us say that company X owns a design Dx and it inserted specific watermarks 
Wx. When another company Y obtains the IP core Dx, it will not know that there are 
watermarks Wx contained in Dx. And if it involves in illegally claiming the Dx design as 
its own, Company X can then prove that Company Y has illegally used its design by 
detecting the watermarks Wx and proving it to the jury. This way one can protect his 
design from being used by another party without consent. There is also the problem of IP 
counterfeiting wherein a fraudulent party can sell its sub standard IPs under the name of a 
well established party. Watermarks do not prevent illegal copying or counterfeiting and 
hence this type of IP problem is not our focus in this work. The inserted watermarks can 
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however find if there is any abuse of IP once there is a doubt. These are hidden by the 
owner of the design so that he can prove his identity in times of conflict and IP fraud.  
1.2 Usage of Side-channels in Watermarking 
Most of the watermarks are very small so that they can be kept hidden within the 
big IP design of the ASIC in the case of hardware or program code in the case of 
software. In the case of hardware, we insert a small logic that makes use of a unique key, 
performs a combinational logic with this key, and makes this information available to the 
owner or verifier. In the case of software, we will insert a few lines of code that is based 
on the same principle of using a unique ID / key and a function along with it. The 
watermark design will be small when compared to the existing IP design.   In such cases, 
the detection of such watermarks should be efficient, but can be tricky. In the case of 
media watermark like images and videos, signal processing methods are used. Similarly, 
for watermarks used in integrated circuits and program codes, there should be efficient 
methods that can detect the watermark clearly.  
When an IC is computing an operation, it consumes power, generates heat, and 
also emits radiations. For example, when a processor is used for computation for 
sometime it tends to heat up. This is due to the components of the IC in use. Thousands 
of transistors in use obviously lead to consumption of power and generation of heat and 
radiations. When ICs that compute a crypto algorithm are considered, these radiations 
and power consumption do not represent random energy spent but can be dependent on 
the data or operation computed, and can be exploited to reveal the secret. For example, 
the logic value a transistor can pass can be a 0 or a 1. The power consumption and 
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radiation emitted will be different for 0 and 1, and this information can be correlated to 
reveal whether the key bit is a 0 or 1. Thus, if the radiations and power consumption are 
data dependent, it becomes a huge vulnerability. Paul Kocher made use of these 
vulnerabilities. He proposed differential power analysis [3] that worked based on the 
dependency of power consumption on device activity. These physical measurements can 
then be provoked and monitored by adversaries which results in important information 
which could then be exploited. This important information is termed Side-Channel 
information and attacks targeting such information are called Side-Channel Attacks.  
This side-channel information can be used in the case of watermarking. As we 
know every design will create side-channel information which can be power consumption 
or EM radiations. So when we insert a new circuit, the side-channel information will vary 
because there is an extra logic that can create different power consumption or EM 
radiations. Every design will create side-channels and even a small watermark will have 
its own impact on the overall side-channel from the design. When we consider the side-
channels, there is some difference between the side-channel information from design Dx 
and the design that has watermark Wx in it (Dx + Wx). This difference in the side-channel 
information can then be used in the detection of watermark that was inserted.  
 Detection of such side-channels can prove the existence of the watermark and 
help solve the problem of IP fraud. This thesis focuses on watermarking application and 
the use of EM side-channels for the detection of such watermarks. We will now discuss 
side-channel information and what analysis is required for the detection of watermarks. 
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1.3 Side-channels 
Side-channel analysis is a new research area that has gained more and more 
interest since the late nineties. The research in this area has shown that physical leakage 
caused by the implementation of a secure mathematical algorithm can be crucial in terms 
of security. For example, such a leakage can be sufficient to extract secret key material 
from cryptographic implementations. Different Crypto algorithms may follow different 
methods and steps to encrypt and decrypt a message, but the heart of any algorithm 
remains the secret key. Intermediate values that depend on part of the keys are the 
preferred target of the attackers. Attacks are performed on this information when a 
cryptosystem is running its normal operation.  In cryptanalysis, a side-channel attack is 
the class of attack where an attacker will try to deduce what is occurring inside a device 
by observing the information that leaks during the normal functioning of the device rather 
than brute force or theoretical weaknesses in the algorithms. That is to say the side-
channel attacks do not prove anything about the security provided by the mathematical 
and technical functions involved, but rely on how well they are carried out without 
leakage. For example, timing information, power consumption, electromagnetic leaks or 
even sound can provide an extra source of information which can be exploited to break 
the system.  Like the power side-channels, EM side-channel is an important information 
source and is available when any system operates. The sources of such EM radiations are 
given below [6], [8]: 
 Direct Emanation 
These emanations result from the intentional current flows within the circuits. The 
current flow takes place in the circuit when it performs its assigned function. This 
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intentional current flow generates time-varying electric and magnetic fields which are 
related by Maxwell‟s equations. In CMOS circuits, these current flows consist of short 
bursts of current with sharp rising edges that occur during the switching operation and 
result in EM emanations that can be observed over a wide frequency band. 
 Unintentional Emanation  
This kind of emanation arises from the fact that most modern devices pack a large 
number of circuits and components into a very small area and suffer from numerous 
unintentional electrical and electromagnetic couplings between components, depending 
on their proximity and geometry. Such couplings are a rich source of emanations that can 
be compromised and are being neglected by the majority of the designers since these 
couplings do not affect the functionality of the device. With technology scaling, these 
unintentional emanations are going to rise considerably and thus are going to be targeted 
by attackers. 
The side-channel information from each device can be retrieved via 2 methods 
which are classified based on their approach as: 
1) Active methods 
2) Passive methods 
 
The active method as the name indicates, involves getting information from the 
device by tampering with the outer layer of the device and then analyzing how the device 
behaves, extracting information by placing probes on top of the different parts of the 
device. 
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On the other hand, just observation of the radiations and leakages from the device 
without even tampering with the device can provide information that could be used and is 
called passive, as it does not involve any active tampering. This passive method is what 
we will deal in this work. There are different sources that can be passively used. They are 
listed below according to the year when they were first accomplished. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1  Types of passive attacks 
 
 
Although these are extremely efficient, side-channel analyses require considerable 
technical knowledge of the internal operation of the system on which the cryptography is 
implemented. These side-channel analyses when classified based on their complexity are 
listed below, 
1. Simple Side-channel Analysis  
2. Differential Side-channel Analysis 
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Simple Side-channel Analysis is that which makes use of the information that is 
directly available from a measurement trace. This side-channel analysis is useful when 
the power or EM side-channels from different operations are easily distinguishable by 
visual inspection. For example, in case of a micro controller performing addition and 
multiplication operations, the power/EM signal consumed when performing addition is 
different from the power/EM signal consumed when performing a multiplication and can 
be easily observed. If crypto algorithms like DES or AES are used, visual inspection 
should lead to first finding out where the different rounds are, although knowing the 
algorithm and where the rounds are is not considered as an attack.  
[3] 
Figure 1.2  Power signal showing 16 rounds of DES operation  
 
 
The implementation of operations that generate traces having key dependent 
branching can be analyzed with this method. Here the key has a simple relationship with 
the operations that are visible in the trace. The following diagrams show clearly how 
simple power analysis is achieved. 
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[31] 
Figure 1.3  SPA of Square Multiplication operation  
 
 
Differential Side-channel Analysis is the method where the side-channel 
differences are not directly visible in one measurement trace. This side-channel attack 
needs a number of measurement traces with different inputs. This requires statistical 
methods to be applied. One specific intermediate result such as an S-box is targeted. The 
analysis is continued with different guesses of the key until the correct key guess is 
obtained. The guesses are made and the corresponding traces are divided into 2 groups 
based on the guess for a bit to be a „0‟ or a „1‟. All the traces in group 1 are added 
together and all the traces in group 0 are added together. Then they are averaged and the 
difference between the averages of group 1 and group 0 is calculated. If the key guess 
made is correct, we can expect to see a considerable amount of spike or peak and for 
other incorrect key guesses, the difference of averages would yield only random noise 
and not a peak. Figure 1.5 shows the correct and wrong key guesses. 
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[3] 
Figure 1.4   DPA waveform with correct and wrong key guesses  
 
Initially, these analyses methods were mainly focused on attacking an embedded 
system. There are also the concepts of Trojans inserted by an insider which aids leaking 
out the secret information without the concerned party‟s knowledge.  The Trojans are 
small circuits that an insider inserts into the original clean design so that it will leak out 
the secret information to the outside world. These Trojans can be of different types and 
are explained in [46]. The watermarks inserted in our case follow concepts and designs 
similar to that of the Trojan, but for a constructive purpose. 
1.4 Motivation 
The side-channel information was initially used to attack systems but it could also 
be used in a constructive way in order to provide Intellectual Property rights and 
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privileges where the concept of Trojans is flipped around to help the owner.  Usage of 
side-channel for constructive purposes is limited to power side-channels and mainly for 
micro controllers. Usage of EM side-channels for Hardware Trojans and Hardware and 
Software Watermarks has not been attempted before and provides the motivation for this 
thesis.  
In this work, we propose to use watermarking using Electromagnetic (EM) side-
channel, which is similar to the power side-channel but has an important advantage of not 
requiring inserting a resistor in the power supply path to monitor power consumption. 
Using EM side-channels could eliminate the requirement to actively probe the device. 
Instead placing a probe passively on top of the device in operation could lead us to the 
watermarks.  
The main contribution from this work is the implementation and detection of very 
small watermarks in ubiquitous devices like microcontrollers and smartcards, as well as 
in FPGA. Also this work proves that EM side-channel can detect the watermark clearly 
and requires no clean setup and active access to the device. We validate this by providing 
results from both Power and EM side-channel watermark detection. EM side-channels if 
employed by the manufacturer, can check for the watermarks by using an automatic work 
flow involving mechanical arms for the devices, and need not make any active contact, 
such as the power side-channel based watermarking schemes. This can lead to faster 
validation of the devices from the manufacturer‟s perspective. Due to increasing use of 
different Intellectual Property (IP) cores from different companies in order to build a new 
Embedded system or ASIC, there is a need to make sure there is efficient security in 
place to avoid IP theft, counterfeiting and frauds. Digital watermarking for integrated 
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circuits has been proposed in the past as a solution to identify the owner and detect 
frauds, if any. We propose to use existing watermarking principles, and use EM side-
channel information for its detection. These concepts are carried out using EM side-
channels for the first time in this work and explained in the next chapters.   
1.5 Thesis Outline 
In this thesis we will begin with the history and prior work of Electromagnetic 
Side-channel Analysis and Watermarking.  Chapter 3 explains the set up of an 
experimental platform for Microcontroller, Smartcard and FPGA along with the 
exploration of some processing techniques. Chapter 4 explains how EM analysis was 
carried out on a Spartan 3E FPGA. Chapter 5 discusses the usage of Hardware Trojans to 
attack algorithms. Chapter 6 explains the usage of EM side-channel with Watermarking 
for Microcontrollers, Smartcards and FPGA.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORY AND PRIOR WORK 
In this chapter, we will first discuss the history and prior work of side-channel 
based attacks and how side-channels could be used for watermarking applications. The 
first official information related to Side-channel usage dates back to the year 1965. P. 
Wright reported in his book "Spycatcher: the candid autobiography of a senior 
intelligence officer" that the British intelligence agency tried to break a cipher used by the 
Egyptian Embassy in London, but initially their efforts were hindered by the limits of 
their computational power. So in order to overcome the problem, Wright suggested 
placing a microphone near the rotor-cipher machine used by the Egyptians in order to spy 
the click-sound produced by the machine. They then listened to the clicks of the rotors 
every morning when the clerk reset them. Thus MI5 could successfully deduce the 
position of 2 to 3 rotors of the machine. This became additional information which 
considerably reduced the effort in terms of computation needed to break the cipher. This 
also led the MI5 to spy on the embassy‟s communications for many more years.  
2.1 Side-channel Usage for Attacks 
Even the EM side-channel has a history of rumors associated with espionage. The 
defense organizations are obsessed with limiting the electromagnetic emanations from the 
equipments they use.  There are also regulations for commercial ICs about how much 
emissions can be allowed without interfering with the proper operation of the chip and 
are classified into the Electromagnetic Interference/ Electromagnetic Compatibility 
(EMI/EMC) areas. Every company places great importance to satisfy these conditions 
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while manufacturing chips. The importance of EM side-channel was first openly stated 
by Van Eck in 1985 [1] when he made use of the EM emanations from a computer or a 
video unit captured from a distance and used them to retrieve the information that was 
displayed on the screen. 
 
[1] 
Figure 2.1   EM signals captured from a computer and reconstructed  
 
Figure 2.1 depicts how the display from a computer was reconstructed using EM. 
But the first side-channel attack on a crypto system was made in 1995 with the advent of 
the use of smart cards and microcontrollers for parking tickets, payment for 
transportation and transactions. In 1995, Timing analysis was the first side-channel based 
attack ever published. Paul Kocher [2] described the methodology to compromise keys of 
RSA, DSS and other cryptosystems by measuring the execution time for the overall 
cryptographic operation. This attack required an attacker to be able to simulate or predict 
the timing behavior of the attacked device rather accurately. In 1998, a much more 
efficient side-channel was introduced by Paul Kocher, Joshua Jaffe, and Benjamin Jun- 
Differential Power Analysis [3]. The power consumed by a cryptographic device was 
analyzed during the processing of the cryptographic operation. The power consumption 
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turned out to include deterministic data-dependent parts which can be exploited by 
Simple Power Analysis and Differential Power Analysis. From then on, specific parts of 
the implementation of the cryptographic algorithms are being observed. For instance, 
Simple Power Analysis looks at the key scheduling process; Differential Power Analysis 
chooses an intermediate result for testing of hypotheses on secret key values. These were 
done mainly on smart cards and micro controllers which were mainly used on the 
payment systems of subway, parking areas, toll booths etc.  
In 2000/2001, the use of Electromagnetic Emanation as a side-channel was 
demonstrated by Jean-Jacques Quisquater and David Samyde [4] as well as Karine 
Gandolfi et al. [5]. These were the first openly published works on the EM analysis of 
ICs and CPUs. The EM side-channels include a higher variety of information. The 
analysis is performed on chip cards, and they used tiny antennas that were placed in very 
close proximity to the IC. This made use of the Electromagnetic radiations emitted by 
any embedded device and does not need a resistor in the power supply path, as is required 
for power analysis. It needed just a handmade loop antenna to first show that better attack 
could be performed with some analysis basics as required for power. It was found that 
space localization can be performed in electromagnetic analysis [7].  
Since the EM emanations may depend on the physical characteristics of the active 
gates, a single EM sensor could capture multiple EM signals of different types. These 
signals can be extracted and analyzed individually. In general the chip contains a CPU, 
clock unit, memory, Flash and so on depending on the embedded system. We know that 
not all of them consume the same power and also not all of them are in use at a certain 
time. Based on the action performed, some are active and some are not at any given point 
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of time. So depending upon the activity, the EM radiations emitted are different and the 
loop antennas made can pick up these EM signals from each of the different areas of a 
chip. Based on the position of the antenna and chip, the EM radiation varies due to the 
direction of the current. This is different from power analysis wherein the power 
measured is the power of all the active units. Once we get different EM radiations we can 
find out the areas with different emissions and with the knowledge of the activity of 
different components of the embedded system it is easy to find out which component is 
where. We can also find where in the design under test are the CPU, FLASH, a RAM and 
an internal clock generator [14]. 
[14] 
Figure 2.2  Floorplan of DUT used 
 
A comparison of the EM radiations of different algorithms gives rise to more 
knowledge about the algorithm and with statistical data, a simple or differential EM 
analysis can be performed. Additionally there are EM attacks that can be applied from a 
certain distance. This was proven by Agrawal et al. [6] in 2002. This was the most 
comprehensive study undertaken in Electromagnetic Analysis, which took the 
unintentional emanations into consideration. Handmade near field probes were used for 
that and since the captured signals were very low in amplitude a wideband amplifier was 
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needed. The captured signal was then analyzed using an oscilloscope. The factor of 
needing precise measurements and better positioned probes paved way to experiments 
that used probes being monitored by a computer. The research in this area gained so 
much popularity that we now get near field probes from companies like Rhode and 
Schwarz, EMV Technik, ETS Lindgren. 
Although side-channel attacks have been specialized to custom ASICs since 1998, 
attacks targeting specifically FPGAs have been reported more recently. The EM side-
channel attacks were performed on an FPGA that implements a cryptographic algorithm 
in [12], [13], [17], [18]. Thus starting from smart card, the Electromagnetic analysis 
diversified and instilled interest among the researchers over the years, and is being 
considered as a potential research area that needs to be exploited even more. This kind of 
near field scanning using an exclusive side-channel setup was demonstrated in [14] and 
[15], where even the origin of the electromagnetic emanation could be found using 
SEMA in the time domain. A Low-cost near field mapping system started to get used 
which can scan automatically and dynamically the magnetic emissions from the chip. 
Labs which could afford high precision equipments used one such setup in [14], where 
the computer controls the position of the probe over the design under test. The probes are 
placed very close to the design under test but even then need an amplifier, since the 
captured signals would be of very low amplitude. These signals after amplification are 
fed to the oscilloscope, which is also controlled by the computer. The computer stores the 
waveforms obtained and helps in the post treatment of the waveforms.  
Since all these attacks were made possible it became imperative to find ways to 
protect them and also provide constructive uses of the Side-channel analysis. To protect 
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the chip from side-channel attacks, these chips started using side-channel resistant logic 
[21], [22], [23]. Also, there are concepts like the intentional increase in the noise so that 
the Signal to Noise ratio would decrease and make it difficult for the attackers, better 
implementation of branching, and randomness.  
Recently, there have been more practices of outsourcing designs and chips instead 
of having them in house or home grown. This is mainly due to the cost benefits and 
reduced time and effort required from a company‟s perspective. More and more 
companies have started following the Intellectual property based designs and are Fab-less 
companies. They manufacture their chips in alien countries and thus are prone to security 
issues. The dangers of fabrication in alien countries are studied in [25]. The main 
problem of such fabrication in alien countries is that there are possibilities of insider 
based attacks as there is not enough control of the personnel in foreign countries. The 
attacker in this case can be working within the fabrication plant and plan to insert some 
new circuits that alter or affect the basic functionality thus breaching the security of 
chips. As mentioned in [48] there can be many Phases like Design, Fabrication, Testing ; 
Abstraction levels like RTL, Gate level, transistor level and Physical level where they can 
be inserted, different activation methods and different places in the design where they 
could be inserted.  The possibilities of Hardware Trojans being inserted in chips were 
being thought of and even competitions to show case the usage of Trojans and possible 
detection of them were held [33]. Basically, the Trojans should not be found when 
functional testing is done. The main idea in the competition was that the Trojans remain 
dormant until a specific condition is reached and once it is reached it should find a way to 
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leak the important information needed for the attackers. Detection methods that can be 
used to find such Trojans have been shown in [24] and [46]. 
[25] 
Figure 2.3  Trojan Side-channel  
 
2.2 Constructive Use Of Side-channels: Watermarking 
Due to increasing usage of different IP cores from different companies in order to 
build a new system or ASIC, we also need to make sure there is efficient security in place 
to avoid IP theft, counterfeiting and frauds. To address this issue for hardware designs, 
the concept of using small circuits along with the original design called Watermarking 
([26], [29]) came into play. This is similar to the Trojan concepts explained above, but 
uses the same concept for constructive purposes. This idea of watermarking might be 
relatively new to hardware designs, but has been incorporated in the case of software 
codes, web page data, video and audio in order to protect the digital content. These 
watermarks circuits that are inserted are very small when compared to the original 
designs.  There have been many watermarking schemes proposed especially for the 
software concepts where detection of such watermark needs the software code [40] or 
access to the memory structure ([41],[42]). However, Side-channel watermarks do not 
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need any such requirement, as detection of such watermarks can be possible just by 
monitoring the power consumption [36]. This is possible due to the very light weight 
structure of the watermark, which could hide itself underneath the power consumption of 
the other processes in the device.  
The usage of EM side-channels for Hardware Trojans as well as Watermarking 
has not been explored, and in this thesis we have attempted to address this issue by 
making use of EM Trojans and modifying them as Hardware watermarks on FPGA and 
Software watermarks for Smartcards and microcontrollers which are explained in 
Chapters 5 and 6.   
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CHAPTER 3 
EXPERIMENTAL PLATFORM 
This chapter explains the experimental setup and the methods involved in 
performing the EM Side-channel analysis on a device under test: FPGA, Microcontroller 
and Smartcard.  
The target device varies among the above-mentioned 3 Design under tests 
(DUTs), while the PC is the controlling device that controls the communication with the 
DUT. The PC also supplies different inputs and contains the disk space to save the data 
from the oscilloscope based on a trigger condition. The oscilloscope used here is 
Tektronix DPO 7104, where 4 channels of data can be monitored. The EM probes from 
ETS Lingdren are used for capturing the Electromagnetic radiations from the target 
device. The setup required is shown in Figure 3.1. 
Choosing the best probe among the available probes can be a task that can be 
accomplished by testing all the probes for the best signals. After trying all the probes, it is 
found that the magnetic loop probes give the wanted EM radiations and are placed on the 
DUT after finding the best spot, by placing the loop at different locations and checking 
the signals on the oscilloscope. 
 Using the probes in different angles will produce different Electromagnetic 
signals with different polarity. The best possible angle is obtained by keeping the probe at 
different positions and checking the signal with the scope. This would be made easier 
when running a program continuously and checking the scope by changing its settings as 
and when required.  In general, the smallest loop probe available should be used so that 
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the advantage of locality can be fully achieved and the probe in a slightly tilted position 
as shown below, gave us better results.  
 
Figure 3.1  Measurement Setup for EM Analysis 
 
3.1 Hardware Used 
3.1.1 Target Devices 
We used FPGA, Microcontrollers and Smart Cards as target devices. We have 
used the smartcards and microcontrollers as they are increasingly used in day-to-day life 
and can be a perfect platform for security related research. The FPGA has been used 
since it is relatively easy to obtain when hardware chip is concerned. Custom made 
ASICs could be made but require more effort and time. Although, FPGA would involve 
considerable amount of hardware design and implementation skills and is a preferred 
target for current hardware security research. 
In FPGA, we have mainly used Spartan 3E Starter Board as our target device but 
we have also used a Basys2 board from Digilent in the case of hardware Trojans, where 
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we used the Basys2 board as the Crypto Core and Spartan 3E Board as the Control Core. 
Implementation of logic designs like Toggler, PRESENT, and TEA for FPGAs is done in 
Verilog. We wanted to test the watermarks in the case of smartcards. So we had to get a 
smartcard which could be written into and got a microcontroller based smartcard. We 
made use of an ATMega 163 Fun card. We also need a Smartcard programmer for which 
we used Dynamite + Plus programmer and SCM 3310 reader.  We have also used an 
ATMega 8 microcontroller.  
3.1.2 EM Probes 
The EM probes used in this thesis are ETS Lindgren 7405 Near-field EM probes. 
We have mainly made use of the magnetic probes and in particular 903 Magnetic (H) 
Field Probe which has a loop of 1 cm. The E/H or H/E Rejection is about 11 dB and it 
can support up to 2.3 Ghz of resonant frequency. Since EM signals are prone to noise and 
can be easily distorted in a very noisy environment like a lab, it is necessary to use a pre-
amplifier before connecting the EM probe to the scope. We use a pre-amplifier which has 
a bandwidth of 100 Khz to 3 Ghz. 
3.1.3 Oscilloscope 
 The Oscilloscope used here is Tektronix DPO 7104, which has a bandwidth of up 
to 1 Ghz and has 4 channels with a maximum sample rate of 40 Gs/s. 
Apart from these main devices needed, we would also need a GPIB or LAN 
connection in order to capture the traces from the scope. We have used Agilent 82357B 
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USB/GPIB Interface for FPGA, and LAN for Smartcard and micro controller, to provide 
Communication between the Oscilloscope and the PC.  
3.2 Target Platform Basics 
The first step for all the analysis is to get the platform up and running. Different 
DUTs require us to know different functions, protocols and methods. This section 
explains how to make the different platforms ready for data acquisition and analysis. This 
is to mainly explain what equipments are required, and what steps are to be followed to 
get the setups created. 
3.2.1. Smartcards 
We work with smartcards to insert watermarks and detect those using EM side-
channels. The first thing is to choose the smartcard and smartcard reader that 
communicates with the smartcard. We have used the ATMega 163 Card, which has an 8-
bit microcontroller with 512 Byte internal EEPROM and 16K Byte programmable flash 
memory and 256K bit external EEPROM. This provides enough space for programs that 
include crypto blocks as well. We have written the watermark program in assembly level 
language using AVR Studio. The crypto OS and the functions are obtained from an open 
source code available online. We will need a programmer that can program the respective 
smartcards. We have used Dynamite Plus smartcard programmer with its compatible 
software: Cas Interface Studio 9.0.0. This software can program a number of other 
smartcards as well. The procedure to write a program into the card is fairly simple and 
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can be obtained from the Cas interface user manual [43].  This explains what we need to 
write the assembly codes and program it onto the smartcard.  
Once we have the smartcard ready, we will need a smartcard reader that is 
controlled by the PC to communicate with the smartcard by sending messages and 
waiting for the responses. We should understand how the open source code uses the 
transmission protocols and the different functions so that we can write the wrapper for the 
smartcard programmer which communicates with the smartcard and the PC.  The aim of 
our wrapper program is to send messages to the smartcard, wait until it performs the 
required code with watermark and save the responses. This is done a number of times 
while the EM probe can capture the EM traces from the smartcard.  
The contact type smartcard falls under the ISO/IEC 7816-3 standard. There are 
two main transmission protocols T0 and T1 we will need to know. The difference 
between the 2 protocols arises from the way data is transferred, where T0 is byte oriented 
and T1 is block oriented. The error detection used for the transfer also varies with the T1 
protocol having an EDC at the end of each block apart from the parity bits which is 
common for both the protocols. The open source protocol uses T1 protocol in our case.  
The protocol used for transmission is important as it is based on the protocol that 
the APDUs (Application protocol data unit) are designed upon. The APDU is required for 
the entire data exchange between the PC and the smartcard. But APDUs which are under 
the ISO/IEC 7816-4 standard are independent of the transmission protocols. As we said 
earlier, we have to send messages and receive responses from the smartcard. Both of 
these follow a certain structure, and are listed below. This should be known in order to 
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send and receive messages properly. We will make use of this structure while we write 
the wrapper for PC and smartcard communication. 
 
 
Figure 3.2  Structure of a Command APDU 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3  Structure of a Response APDU 
 
The following table denotes what each field means in terms of the card 
communication. 
Table 3.1. APDU Description 
Field 
name 
Description 
CLA Instruction class. Used to Identify applications and their 
specific command sets 
INS Instruction byte which encodes the actual command. In 
our case, it can be used to denote Set Key, Encrypt and 
Decrypt 
P1-P2 Instruction parameters for the command in order to 
provide more information about the command. Eg. 
Offset into file at which to write the data 
LC Indicates the number of bytes of command data to follow 
DATA The actual data being sent 
LE Indicates the number of bytes of data sent back from the 
card 
 
 27 
 
The card will always send the trailer back, and the body is optional. The body is 
the response data, dependent on the operation being performed. The two bytes SW1 and 
SW2 are called the return codes, and denotes the response from the card. The SW1 and 
SW2 can assume different values based on how the communication proceeds. The value 
varies for successful communication and a failure. The causes for a failure in the 
communication can also be found out from this return code. Knowing the causes for 
failures will help in debugging the errors. The main categories of return codes are listed 
below in the Table 3.2. For more exclusive error codes, refer to [44]. The following table 
denotes the different return codes and their descriptions. 
Table 3.2. Return codes and description 
Return 
Code 
Process Process 
Completion 
Description 
90 00 
61 XX 
Normal 
Processing 
Process 
Completed 
Success 
62 XX Warning 
Processing 
Process 
Completed. 
Warning: State of the non 
volatile memory not 
changed 
63 XX Warning 
Processing 
Process 
Completed. 
Warning: State of the non 
volatile memory changed 
64 XX Execution 
Error 
Process 
Aborted 
Error: State of non volatile 
memory not changed 
65 XX Execution 
Error 
Process 
Aborted 
Error: State of the non 
volatile memory changed 
67 XX 
To 
6F XX 
Checking 
Errors 
Process 
Aborted 
Check errors 
 
 
We have now discussed smartcards and the transmission basics. The last part of 
making the smartcard setup work is to make use of the programmed card and the protocol 
basics, APDU formats, and create a wrapper or a program that automates the sending and 
receiving of messages between the reader and the smartcard. We have used an SCM 3310 
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smartcard reader. This is a PC/SC compatible smartcard reader that can work with T0/T1 
protocols. The PC/SC framework is the necessary OS required for the smartcard 
environment to be run on a PC based system. Microsoft has created a set of functions that 
should only be used in order to work with the PC/SC based smartcard reader and cards. 
There are a number of functions listed in [45] but we can make the smartcard 
environment work with just the basic required functions.  These are listed below.  
1. SCardEstablishContext 
2. SCardListReaders 
3. SCardConnect 
4. SCardTransmit 
5. SCardStatus 
6. SCardDisconnect 
7. SCardReleaseContext 
 
SCardEstablishContext is the first function to be called.  This function is 
necessary to establish the Resource manager context within which all the other operations 
can be performed. This is the platform that needs to be established or connected so that 
the smartcard environment is in use. 
SCardListReaders is the function that lists the various smartcard readers 
connected to the resource manager context. We use only one smartcard reader but this 
function can list all the readers that are connected. In our case this function would return 
SCM 3310 Microsystems. 
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SCardConnect is the function which when called, can establish the connection 
between the calling application and the smartcard which is inside the smartcard reader 
using the resource manager context. 
SCardTransmit is the function that is used to send some commands to the 
smartcard and expects to receive the response from the card.  This function makes use of 
the data to be sent as a parameter variable but it should be made sure that the command 
data follows the APDU format explained above. This function could be used in a loop to 
make the setup automated.   
SCardStatus is the function that is needed to check for the status of the 
connected card and reader, to find out whether the card is connected properly. You can 
call it any time after a successful call to SCardConnect and before a successful call 
to SCardDisconnect. I have used this function all the time so as to find the status of the 
card and reader at all times. When there is no problem the function need not return 
anything. But in case of a disconnection we could have an error that pops up.  
SCardDisconnect is used when all the necessary transactions are completed. This 
is to disconnect the existing card from the resource manager context. This can be used if 
we need to use more than one smartcard. It should also be noted that in that case we need 
to use SCardConnect for the new card after disconnecting the existing card. 
SCardReleaseContext is the final function that should be used to release the 
resource manager context. It frees up all the resources that were used and also frees up 
the memory used.  Once this is called, we need to start from SCardEstablishContext in 
order to use the smartcard system again. 
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I used the above mentioned functions and automated the transmission of messages 
in order to get the EM side-channels for a number of measurements.  
3.2.2. FPGA 
The other platform we used in this work is based on FPGA. We used it for Simple 
Electromagnetic Analysis, Differential Electromagnetic analysis, EM analysis for 
hardware Trojans and Watermarking. The hardware needed for this is the FPGA being 
used. We have used a Spartan 3E FGA and also a Basys2 FPGA. We have also de-
soldered the coupling capacitors in order to help for power analysis in the case of Spartan 
3E FPGA so as to isolate the noise sources from the board. 
We write the codes for the FPGA in Verilog and use Xilinx ISE for all the work 
related to the design. We generate the HDL, synthesize it, run the timing, and place and 
route the design using Xilinx ISE. We then port the bit file using Impact function of 
Xilinx ISE for Spartan 3E, and Digilent Adept in the case of Basys 2 FPGA. We also use 
Xilinx EDK in order to create a microprocessor inside the FPGA. This is used in the case 
of Trojans and Watermarking circuits for the FPGA that controls the crypto core. We 
need this design to send different Inputs and a Trigger signal. The reason why we keep 
this as a micro processor and in a separate FPGA is to avoid the noise that can interfere 
with the crypto core which we will need to attack and detect the secret value. The 
connections between the 2 different FPGAs are connected using normal wires that ensure 
connection between the IO pins. 
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3.2.3. Microcontrollers 
We have made use of an ATMEGA8 microcontroller, which helps in creating a 
very light-weight watermark using only 4 to 5 assembly level instructions which can 
easily be hidden in the rest of the operation the microcontroller performs. 
We created a 2 PCB setup using the ATMEGA8 microcontroller in one of the 
Printed Circuit Boards (PCB) and used the other PCB to supply the different challenges 
using a serial connection. Both were powered with different power supplies. The 2 PCB 
setup also isolates the core which here is the microcontroller from outside sources of 
noise such as the fluctuations of power supply from a PC and capacitances in the power 
supply line. We can use AVR Studio to create assembly codes for the micro controller. 
Apart from this, we will need codes to automate the capture of traces, and once we get 
the traces, codes for analyzing them.  
3.3 Steps In Acquisition Of Data 
For performing successful side-channel analysis we need to obtain a lot of 
measurements from the target device. We need this by doing a certain procedure a 
number of times by automation. The steps needed to be followed are: 
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Figure 3.4  Data Acquisition Steps  
 
As seen in the above flowchart, we first need to establish that the desired target 
device has the desired logic and is waiting for a trigger and inputs. The PC is used to 
control the Serial Connection needed to communicate with the DUT so that each new set 
of inputs and a trigger signal are given. In order to capture the traces for different set of 
inputs, the oscilloscope should be armed in such a way that when there is a trigger, the 
oscilloscope waits and captures the traces obtained by the probes. This captured trace 
should be then stored in the PC. This is done by using GPIB or LAN. Once the trace is 
captured, the trigger option in the oscilloscope should go back to the normal state so that 
the next trigger can arrive and the new set of traces can be obtained in the same manner 
as described. This procedure is done until the required number of measurements is done.  
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3.4 Pre-Processing Of The Traces 
The traces are captured based on a trigger signal from the target device. Finding a 
trustable hardware trigger signal is a difficult task and, even if this is accomplished, there 
can be some errors as these hardware generated triggers are bound to have some 
mismatch and would not arrive instantly as required, since the clock signal of the target 
device by itself is not without errors. For example, The Spartan 3E board uses a 50 MHz 
clock generated by a crystal oscillator. But this clock signal when measured varies for 
different Spartan 3E boards. It was 48 MHz for one board and 52 MHz for another. 
Therefore, some margin of error has to be allocated for this and this necessitates pre-
processing of the captured data before performing post-processing analysis to extract the 
key.  
3.4.1 Alignment 
Sometimes the algorithm does not start at the same time. This can affect the 
correlation of the signals as there are 1000s of traces being captured and each can be 
different and might not have the expected peaks at the desired location. The following 
diagrams clearly show how different traces have different peaks and how it affects the 
overall traces.  
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Figure 3.5  a) Traces Before Alignment b) Traces After Alignment 
 
Though the amplitude difference between the two trigger traces is not that big, the 
point to be considered here is, there will be differences in the timing period, which needs 
careful alignment. This could be because of clock jitters, or if two different cores with 
inevitable minute differences in the clock rates or altogether different clock rates are 
used. This is shown in the graphs before and after alignment. In Figure 3.5-a, we can see 
the accumulation of errors in the positions of a lot of traces. Figure 3.5-b shows the same 
set of traces after alignment. This step of alignment is the first step to be followed when 
considering any attack. 
3.4.2 Filtering 
Filtering the traces for required frequencies and leaving out the unimportant 
frequency component of the traces can improve signal to noise ratio in terms of 
correlation. The unimportant frequency components are considered to be noise since it 
does not provide any use for the EM analysis. We will know the frequency at which the 
FPGA or smart card runs. As mentioned in [6], there can be some information from the 
unnoticed frequency components. If we know the range of needed frequencies, we can 
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use a Bandpass filter on the raw traces before using them for EM analysis. Also, if we 
need only lower frequencies/ higher frequencies we could use a Low pass filter/ High 
pass filter.  Filters can be easily generated using the fdatool of Matlab. It involves a GUI 
wherein we can enter the frequency of interest and generate codes for such filters. 
The following diagrams show one such trace obtained from the Spartan 3E 
FPGA. 
 
Figure 3.6  a) EM signal with low frequency component domination. b) 
EM signal After Filtering 
 
 
It can be seen that Figure 3.6-a shows a continuous stream of toggle operations at 
high frequency but it can also be noted that it follows a low frequency modulation signal. 
When we do not need this low frequency modulation signal, we could remove it using a 
high pass filter and using those low frequencies in the stopband of the filter. Figure 3.6-b 
shows low frequency removed and how it can flatten out the toggle waveform obtained. 
Filtering will be useful when we collect a number of traces with large sample points. 
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3.4.3 Frequency Domain Analysis 
All the above work was done in time domain. In some cases ([6], [8]), it is proved 
that the frequency domain is used to suppress the unwanted noise and also to reveal more 
information from the normally neglected frequencies. As it is found that sometimes the 
third harmonics can contain important information about the key, changing the domain of 
the traces helps in identifying which frequency components are important. It is found 
from the previously mentioned works that not only in the frequencies that are multiples of 
the clock, but also in the other low frequencies, potential side-channel information could 
be leasked. Such EM analysis is called Electromagnetic Frequency Analysis and has been 
proved successful although in this thesis all the work was carried out in the time domain.  
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CHAPTER 4 
SIDE-CHANNEL ANALYSIS ON FPGA 
This chapter explains the implementation of Side-channel attacks on a Spartan 3E 
FPGA board. Electromagnetic side-channel analysis is done on the implementations of 
“Toggler” and “AES SBOX” designs. 
4.1 Programs Used 
4.1.1  Program1: Toggler 
The Toggler design is a small logic which has a 20 bit register that has values 
with increasing hamming weights every alternate clock cycle separated by a return to 
zero so that Electromagnetic analysis could be done on the hamming distances. Once the 
value reaches 20 logic 1s, it starts back again at 0 moving towards 20 1s. Simple 
Electromagnetic Analysis (SEMA) is employed on this design. Table 4.1 depicts the 
operation of the Toggler. 
Table 4.1.  Operation of Toggler 
Clock Cycle Value of the 20 bit register 
1 0 
2 1 
3 0 
4 11 
5 0 
6 111 
…. ….. 
40 11111111111111111111(20 1s) 
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41 0 
42 1 
 
4.1.2 Program2: AES Sbox  
This is an implementation of an AES Sbox with different inputs having three 
main parts which are listed below 
1. LFSR generated different 8 bit inputs 
2. XOR function of 8 bit input and 8 bit key 
3. AES Substitution Box 
SBOX
8 BIT O/P8 BIT I/P
BIT XOR
8 BIT KEY
8 BIT 
PLAINTEXT
 
 
Figure 4.1   Components used for DEMA on AES SBOX 
 
This implementation is used to test Differential Electromagnetic Analysis 
(DEMA) on the Spartan 3E Board. The initial seed for LFSR is noted so as to perform the 
Analysis after capturing different EM and Power traces. The XOR function of each 8-bit 
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input and 8-bit key forms the main crypto design in this implementation along with the 
Sbox table. The analysis is done to extract the correct key guess among the possible 255 
key guesses. 
4.2  Simple Electromagnetic Analysis 
This type of side-channel analysis is generally used to extract the key of a 
cryptographic design by just capturing a trace and locating the operations, and based on 
clocks, guess the key mainly based on visual inspection. We have made use of this 
technique for a simple toggle program so that we can easily visualize the operations 
involved, even though there is nothing crypto in this implementation. From the diagram 
given below, it can be observed that the operation followed by the design is easily 
detectable by visual inspection. 
From the logic listed above, we can see that the hamming distance keeps 
increasing before falling to 0 so that the difference of hamming weights and hamming 
distances between 2 consecutive clock cycles is always the same. What we expect is to 
find a waveform that looks like saw tooth waveform. The EM and power traces are 
captured when the FPGA is functioning. The following diagrams depict the Clock and 
EM signals obtained from the Spartan 3E FPGA. 
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Figure 4.2    Toggler EM Waveform  
 
 
 
Figure 4.3   Toggler Clock 
 
   
Once we have the waveforms of clock and EM radiations we inspect the number 
of clock cycles needed for one single toggle operation to complete. We note down the 
clock cycles at which we have the peaks from the EM operation. These peaks should 
coincide with the time at which each step in one toggle operation occurs. The Hamming 
distance model is also predicted, and for toggle the prediction is easy, as the hamming 
distance should keep increasing for this operation. In this case HD (v0, v1) = HW (v0, v1). 
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The comparison between the peaks and the corresponding hamming distances are found 
out using Matlab. We make use of this comparison for all the possible peaks and 
predicted hamming distance models. This way, our prediction was correct almost 95% of 
the time as the hardware implementation of a very small design is easier and does not 
have many errors. 
The same mechanism can be used for power analysis which will require a resistor 
in the path of the power supply VDD of the FPGA chip. Using the scope‟s cable to 
monitor the power or current across the resistor gives the power waveform. This does not 
involve key extraction but to get ourselves familiar with prediction and comparison of 
obtained data, this experiment helps. This method, when implemented on a key 
dependent design should be able to reveal the key using Simple electromagnetic analysis 
as in the case of Square, Multiplication operations of RSA shown in the Introduction 
chapter.  
4.3 Differential Electromagnetic Analysis 
This side-channel analysis is complex and is used if the visual inspection and 
direct relationship between the waveforms and the key cannot be known. This method 
involves a sequence of steps in statistical analysis that needs to be performed repeatedly 
in order to retrieve the key. Almost all attacks need this type of analysis nowadays as 
there is a considerable amount of security in place in embedded systems. The following 
figure explains the procedure required in Differential analysis.  
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Send different plain texts 
(Known)
Capture the EM radiations 
Develop an EM model 
Based on HD or  HW 
Analysis
For every key guess
{
•Based on Selection function 
( MSB bit, LSB bit etc) group 
the traces into 2
•Add all the traces in each 
group and average each group
•Subtract the averages 
Peak = Correct key
No Peak = Incorrect key
}
 
 
Figure 4.4 Differential Analysis Procedure 
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We use this procedure for our AES S box implementation and the steps used are 
explained below: 
Step1: 
Select the algorithm with a secret key and enable it to accept different inputs. The 
measurement setup is made in such a way that it is possible to know the different inputs 
during the analysis stage. For this purpose an LFSR is used to provide the inputs to the 
AES Sbox and we also know the seed value so that we can simulate or predict what the 
values are for each clock cycle. 
Step 2: 
Selection of the target signals. In general many algorithms will use a number of 
Sboxes and the EM side-channel attack should be made on each and every Sbox to find 
out the entire key. In our case, we use a single Sbox as the target.  We target a bit of the 
Sbox output which performs the XOR of the inputs obtained from the LFSR and the 8-bit 
Key.  
Step 3: 
Measurement of different inputs is obtained using the measurement setup. In our 
case around 4000 traces are obtained. 
Step 4: 
Prediction of the Sbox output which we have as the target is made. Here the 
combinational function is an XOR operation between the inputs and 8-bit key. Since we 
know the initial seed we can find the predicted outputs based on the combinational 
function we use. 
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Step 5: 
The prediction of every key guess (255 in this case as 2^8) is carried out in a loop 
with every different input and, with the knowledge of the different inputs, the EM 
radiation model is generated.  
Step 6: 
Once the EM waveforms are measured with different key guesses, they are 
separated into 2 groups: „group 0‟ or „group 1‟ based on the guesses of the key bit. Then 
the waveforms in group 0 are all added and averaged. This is done for group 1 too. The 
the difference of the average of the 2 groups is then calculated.  This leads to a plot with 
just one key guess being correct which could be distinguished based on the correlation 
value plotted.   
These steps are followed in a loop with the n being 255. This varies with the 
number of key bits considered. Generally this is done in terms of 8 bits or 1 byte of the 
key and continued for all the key bytes. 
Figure 4.4 shows the correct key guess having peaks better than the others. The 
correct key guess is noted and if it is for a single S-box, it is then carried out for the other 
S-boxes as well. This method in general can be applied phase by phase to reveal the 
entire key or can be used in order to reduce the efforts needed by a Brute force attack. 
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Figure 4.5 DEMA curves with correct and wrong key guesses 
 
4.3.1 Correlation Based EM Analysis 
An efficient method that was developed as an improvement of DEMA was the 
Correlation based EM analysis. Here the difference is that there are no grouping, 
averaging and difference steps. Instead, this analysis is based on the correlation of the 
hamming distance models and the obtained traces.  The model could be Bit model, or 
hamming weight model as well. This method also focuses on a few bits at a time instead 
of just 1 bit as in the case of DEMA. The prediction of the algorithm, key guesses is the 
same as DEMA.  
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Here correlation between 2 points is considered. The 2 points are actual EM 
radiation and the hypothetical EM radiation obtained after following the steps 1 to 5.  It is 
given by the formula  
       
        
              
 
where,                               
                     ,                      
 E(X) is the mean. 
After finding the correlation between different key guesses, a CC plot is plotted, 
which has the highest correlation for the correct key guess as shown below.  In the figure, 
the trace in black is the correct key, while all the grey traces are wrong key guesses. We 
can see that the correct key clearly isolates itself from the incorrect key guesses.    
  
 
Figure 4.6  CEMA Plot 
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CHAPTER 5 
ELECTROMAGNETIC ANALYSIS USING HARDWARE TROJANS 
This chapter explains the work of hardware Trojans on FPGA. It also provides 
background information on the Symmetric key algorithms that are used in this thesis.  
5.1 Algorithms Involved 
5.1.1 TEA-Tiny Encryption Algorithm 
The TEA- Tiny Encryption Algorithm [34] is a block cipher which is noted for its 
simplicity and implementation which uses only very few lines of code. It was designed 
by David Wheeler and Roger Needham in 1994. Since this algorithm is very simple in 
implementation it found its use in a lot of day-to-day applications such as Xbox consoles. 
TEA operates on 64-bit blocks and uses a 128-bit key. It has a Feistel 
structure with a suggested 64 rounds, typically implemented in pairs termed cycles. It has 
an extremely simple key schedule, mixing all of the key material in exactly the same way 
for each cycle.  
 
Figure 5.1  Two rounds of TEA 
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5.1.2 PRESENT 
PRESENT is a 64-bit block cipher with an 80-bit key, designed for low power, 
low gate count applications. In order to evaluate their design, the creators of PRESENT 
normalized several area optimized designs to the NAND2 gate of the technology used, a 
technique known as gate equivalence (GE). The authors claim an approximate GE of 1.5k 
in their implementation of PRESENT. 
The basic PRESENT algorithm is given in Figure 17 from [35]. There are 32 
rounds with each round consisting of a 64 bit round key XOR, S-box, and a permutation 
layer. After each round, the next round key is generated by the key scheduler and is 
represented by the update box in Figure 5.1. The S-box is the direct 4-4 bit substitution. 
One of the powerful aspects of PRESENT is the simplistic manner by which the 
PRESENT S-box can be implemented in hardware using only 10‟s of gates, which 
compares favorably to AES 8-bit S-box that requires approximately 200 gates. The 
permutation layer reallocates 62 of the 64 bits to different bit positions. Naturally, this 
layer does not require any gates, only specific wire routing, and does not contribute to the 
GE of PRESENT. 
5.1.2.1 PRESENT Key Scheduler 
Before each round of S-box and permutation, an XOR is done with the 64 most 
significant bits of the key, which is then updated with key scheduling algorithm. This is 
done a total of 32 times. The key scheduling algorithm states that the key is rotated by 61 
positions, the 4 most significant bits are put through the PRESENT S-box, and then an 
XOR of bits 19-15 and the round counter is done. 
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Figure 5.2  PRESENT Algorithm Block Diagram 
 
5.2 Hardware Trojans 
A Hardware Trojan is a malicious modification of the circuitry of an integrated 
circuit. It is generally characterized by how it is represented physically and what it does 
when needed. In general, malicious Trojans try to bypass or disable the security fence of 
a system. It can leak confidential information by side-channels like power, EM. The 
hardware Trojans can be designed in such a way to make the chip malfunction at 
important times, or leak some important information when it is related to crypto core or 
military devices or could even make the chip unusable or damage it permanently. 
Hardware Trojans can be any logic function or circuit primitives, but the most dangerous 
Trojans are the ones that can evade most formal Trojan detection techniques.  
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5.2.1 Short Background 
Today's business is global and for this reason outsourcing tasks is a common 
method to increase companies‟ revenues and cut down on unwanted employee hours. 
That is why embedded hardware devices are produced abroad. But along with profits to 
the companies come serious threats, especially for government agencies. Mainly the 
companies and departments that involve classified information like the military, finance, 
and health-related companies need to be vigilant about hardware security. The hardware 
integrity, i.e. a chip has no modifications in comparison with the original chip design, is 
not ensured. Anyone that has access to the manufacturing process of a chip can do 
malicious alterations to the design. The Trojans could be very light weight as in the case 
of [25], making use of only a few transistors when compared to the original design. The 
fabrication of integrated circuits that are manufactured in untrustworthy factories is 
common. In case of an attack scenario, an adversary tries to hide the additional 
components; hence advanced detection techniques are necessary and are being looked 
into. 
5.2.2 EM with Hardware Trojans 
This work is an extension of the work [47] that I along with other lab mates did 
for Embedded Systems Challenge 2010 [33], which is a Hardware Security related 
Competition where we were given a design implementing an encryption algorithm 
hardened against detection schemes and asked to embed Trojans in it so as to leak key or 
plaintext bits.  
 51 
 
The design used is an encryption algorithm called Tiny Encryption Algorithm 
which accepts a 64-bit plaintext inputs and computes a 64-bit cipher text with an 80-bit 
key. The Trojan was embedded in such a way that it will leak the key through EM 
radiations off the chip. 
5.2.2.1 Implementation 
Our Side-channel Trojan consists of two components: a combination function and 
a leakage generating circuit. We made use of a combination function that takes eight 
input bits and eight bits of the key to generate a one-bit output. In our implementation we 
used a simple combination function that ANDs eight key-bits with eight input-bits and 
then computes the XOR sum of these values: 
    
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7 I8K1 K2 K3 K4 k5 k6 K7 K8
Y [47] 
Figure 5.3 Combination function for Trojans 
 
This output bit Y is then leaked out (“transmitted”) using the leakage generating 
circuit. The function of the leakage generating circuit is to generate high activity and 
thereby high EM radiation at a particular point of time, i.e. when the output of the 
combination function is 1 and low activity when the output is 0. We realized this using a 
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few 10-bit shift registers initialized with alternating 1s and 0s that are clocked in the case 
where output is 1 and are not clocked if the output is 0. 
This set up can leak out eight bits of the key. To be able to leak out the entire 128 
bits of the key we subsequently add all of the 16 key bytes to this combination function. 
5.2.2.2 Activation 
The Trojan is activated when it receives the inputs and a trigger signal. We used 
eight input pins to read in the input bits and an input pin as a trigger to activate the 
combination function. It is also possible to use the switches and buttons of the Basys2 
board instead. However, we chose input pins since it made automated measurements 
easier. 
5.2.2.3 Trojan Data 
To reveal the key we performed a differential electromagnetic analysis just as it is 
done in traditional side-channel attacks. In the first step, we took EM-traces of a lot of 
measurements (10,000) for different inputs. We aligned each of these measurements and 
stored the EM-trace and the used input value for each measurement. 
In the next step, we performed an EM analysis to reveal the correct key. At first 
we created a hypothesis for all the measurements for all the possible eight-bit keys. To do 
this, we used the input value for each measurement and computed the output of the 
combination function for all 256 possible eight-bit keys and stored the result in an array. 
This gave us 256 different hypotheses, one for each possible eight-bit key. In the last step 
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we correlated each of these hypotheses with our measured traces. The correct key should 
generate the highest correlation.  
5.2.2.4 Experimental results 
We performed the side-channel analysis as described above using the above 
mentioned Trojan setup but we found that the EM measurements were very noisy and in 
order to increase the signal to noise ratio, we connected the output to an IO pin and used 
the waveforms at that IO pin. Figure 2 shows the result of this Trojan work. For this 
analysis we set the key to “F8F8F8F896969696C3C3C3C3AAAAAAAA” (in 
hexadecimal). As can be seen in the picture, we were able to reveal each key bit. 
Although, it should be noted that we had to feed the output of the combination function to 
an IO pin in order to increase our Signal to Noise ratio. Though this cannot be an actual 
attack scenario in real world, this is a proof of concept that the Trojan analysis could 
work if there is better Signal to noise ratio or in other words, decapsulation of the IC or 
dedicated rooms for attacks without interference of noise will definitely yield better 
results even without the IO pin connection. Figure 5.4 shows the correlation of the 10,000 
EM-traces with the possible keys. The left figure shows the correlation for each key 
guess. The four keys “96”, “AA”,”C3” and”F8” can easily be identified by the four 
correlation peaks. The right picture shows the correlation for different timeslots. 
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Figure 5.4  Leakage of the key with the help of an IO pin 
 
The following figure shows the setup where we used 2 FPGAs with Spartan 3E as the 
“Control FPGA” giving in Inputs and trigger and Basys 2 FPGA As “Cryptographic FPGA”. 
 
 
Figure 5.5  Trojan Setup with Spartan 3E as Control FPGA and Basys2 
as Cryptographic FPGA 
 
The same kind of analysis was done for one more algorithm to find out the 
correlation co efficient with the key set to all „FF‟. However in this case, the number of 
registers that were used for leaking out was increased to 15. We can see that the ease with 
which it could be attacked increased from the fact that the correlation coefficient 
increases to be more than 0.9. For the second algorithm which in this case was 
 55 
 
PRESENT, with better implementation and some resistant techniques like having a lot of 
dummy logic to decrease the SNR of EM signals, it was also found to be sufficient for a 
successful attack with a correlation coefficient of 0.7. 
 
Figure 5.6  EM Analysis on PRESENT with more registers to leak 
 
Figure 5.7  EM Analysis on TEA with more registers to leak 
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CHAPTER 6 
WATERMARKING 
 In this work, we focus on IP theft where in the IP from a legitimate owner is 
being claimed falsely by another party. Since EM analysis needs only a probe and can 
detect the watermark passively without the need for monitoring the power supply line as 
in the case of Power Analysis, it can be used both Pre and Post production stage. Our 
method can help in performing EM analysis with Automation to verify the original 
design in the case of smartcards, microcontrollers, etc before the mass production stage,  
as well as help the vendor provide proof of originality to a customer at the counter after 
the production stage. This work also compares the EM and Power Side-channels 
watermark detection at different levels of setup – clean, custom made setups without 
noise interference to setups under external noise. It should be noted that this work will 
use designs that were used for the Trojan work [47] and modify and use them for 
constructive purposes. But there is also one scenario where one can sell counterfeit 
products under somebody else‟s brand name. The main threat is to the company as its 
brand name will definitely get a hit as these defective or lesser quality ICs will definitely 
wear out before the expected life term of a better brand IC. In this thesis we do not focus 
on this scenario as only the owner of the watermarks we consider can prove it is present. 
Thus we focus only on IP theft in this thesis and not IP counterfeiting. 
 Since EM Watermarking has never been attempted before, this provides 
motivation for EM watermarking and we propose to use EM side-channels with 
watermarking to establish ownership of an IC and the proof required in terms of conflict. 
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In this chapter we discuss the methods in which we implemented the watermark design 
for different platforms and how they were detected using EM side-channels. 
6.1  Watermark Design 
Our work is based on the scenario that the owner/verifier of the design inserts a 
small circuit which we call the Watermark and has the knowledge of the watermark and 
tries to keep it hidden in the remaining design. In order to verify whether there is any 
illegal use of her Intellectual property, she tries to detect the watermark she has inserted. 
If she could detect the watermark and in case there is an illegal use of her IP she can 
prove her ownership. 
The Watermarking concept is similar to the Trojan concept introduced in [25] 
except that it is used for a constructive purpose, which is to avoid IP fraud and 
counterfeiting. Since this involves providing IP rights, we can assume that the owner 
should insert a circuit that provides her identity. So the Watermark design mainly consists 
of: 
1. A key/unique ID that is specific for the owner or even the particular chip 
(assuming the owner is given a set of IDs for her set of products) 
2. Combinational function that can make use of key/ unique ID and some 
incoming messages or random challenges 
3. Leakage generating circuit that depends on the value of the computed 
combinational function to help the owner/verifier to detect the inserted 
watermark  
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In this work, we focus on both Software Watermarks and Hardware Watermarks. 
In the case of Software Watermarks, we make use of platforms that use Assembly level 
language like a Microcontroller and a Smartcard (which is of contact type). Figure 6.1 
shows the assembly level code implementing a combinational functions that makes use of 
the watermark key which here is 35 202 and a Leakage generator code. 
 
 
Figure 6.1  Combinational Logic and Leakage generator for Software 
Watermarking 
 
For the Hardware Watermarking, we make use of FPGAs. We can use of a 64-bit 
key or 128-bit key depending upon the algorithm in use. In this work, we made use of a 
128-bit key as the Unique ID. The “Control FPGA” sends inputs or plaintexts 8-bits at a 
time. The combinational function makes use of 8-bit slice of the 128-bit key and the 
incoming 8-bit Plaintext and produces an output Y. The key slices keep changing for 
every new set of inputs. Figure 6.2 shows the HW Watermark design used.  We make use 
of a set of LFSR or Ring oscillators as leakage generating circuits. 
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Figure 6.2  Design for Hardware Watermarking 
 
 For all the setups we use a DPO7104 Tektronix oscilloscope for capturing the 
waveforms. We use ETS Lindgren 7405 Near Field probes for the EM traces and 
Tektronix TDP 1000 Differential Probe for the power traces. 
6.2 Software Watermarks 
6.2.1 Microcontrollers 
The first platform we have targeted is the Microcontrollers as we know that side-
channel attacks have been made on them a number of times and it is a useful starting 
point due to their step by step functioning, which can help in figuring out the information 
from the raw traces. We have made use of an ATMEGA8 microcontroller which helps in 
creating a very light weight watermark consisting of  only 4 to 5 assembly level 
instructions, which can easily be hidden in the rest of the operation the microcontroller 
performs. 
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We created a 2 PCB setup using the ATMEGA8 microcontroller in one of the 
PCBs and used the other PCB to supply the different challenges using a serial connection 
and powered them both with different power supplies. The 2 PCB setup also isolates the 
core, which here is the microcontroller, from outside sources of noise such as the 
fluctuations of power supply from a PC and capacitances in the power supply line. This 
setup was mainly created in order to provide a clean platform for power analysis which is 
done by placing a resistor in series with the power supply line. Figure 6.3 shows the 
microcontroller setup used in this work.  
 
Figure 6.3  Watermarking setup for microcontroller 
6.2.2 Smartcards 
The next platform we have considered is the Smartcard platform, which is 
ubiquitous nowadays ranging from University cards, Laundry cards, Transportation cards 
and Credit cards. Hence this could potentially be a very relevant place where Side-
channel watermarks could find its use. The platform is pretty similar to the 
microcontroller platform but finding a trigger signal is very hard.  
We have used an ATMega 163 Fun card which has an 8-bit microcontroller based 
on the AVR Architecture. We have used SCM 3310 Smart card reader that has 8 contacts 
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and uses PC/SC API which works with Windows environment. In order to make it useful 
for both power and EM measurements, we have made a custom setup that uses a card slot 
that is connected via wires soldered across the reader contacts. 
 
Figure 6.4  Smart card setup for Watermarking. Left side setup shows 
EM probe on top of the smartcard while right side setup shows EM probe 
near the resistor where power measurements are taken 
 
Figure 6.4 shows the setup used for Smartcard watermarking. This setup is not 
made specifically for Power analysis and is allowed to be prone to noise. 
6.3 Hardware Watermarks 
We have targeted FPGAs for Hardware Watermarking where we use Hardware 
Description Language like VERILOG or VHDL. We have used 2 Spartan 3E FPGAs that 
contain a XC3S500E FPGA in 90nm 8-metal-layer process technology. The 1
st
 one will 
be used as the “Core FPGA” which performs the watermark function and the remaining 
design. The other FPGA is used as a “Control FPGA” which sends different inputs 
through a serial connection.  
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This setup is to make the FPGA setup similar to the one used in SASEBO board 
which is a Standard Evaluation board for Side-channels Analysis. The FPGA logic core is 
powered by a standalone power supply or a normal 5V power supply although the stand 
alone supply from a adjustable voltage supply can have less disturbance and noise. The 
core power can be sensed by a 25mΩ current-sensing resistor with on-board jumpers. The 
EM radiations can be sensed using the EM probe placed on top of the FPGA chip. We 
have de-soldered the core power supply decoupling capacitors to achieve a higher 
resolution of the power traces. Figure 6.5 shows the Hardware Watermarking setup with 
EM and Power probes. 
 
 
Figure 6.5  Hardware Watermarking with the bottom FPGA as the “Core 
FPGA” and top FPGA as the “Control FPGA” 
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6.4 Detection Of Watermarks 
To detect the inserted Watermarks, we make use of the Differential 
Electromagnetic Analysis (DEMA) based on correlation. For this type of analysis, we 
need to take a number of measurements. Figure 6.4 shows the steps involved in the 
detection of the watermarks.  
We follow the standard procedure for the Side-channel attacks whereby the 
assumption is that the owner/verifier can have access to the physical device and can 
capture many traces and also know either the inputs (Plaintexts) sent or the outputs 
(Cipher-texts) obtained from the system. Since the owner/ verifier will know what the 
watermark is, she can compute the output of the combinational function with the given 
inputs and the watermark key and store this value as the correct hypothesis. The owner/ 
verifier can then compute different hypotheses using different inputs and different key 
guesses. Only when the key is correct, the hypothesis can be correct.  The owner/ verifier 
can then correlate all the hypotheses with the actual EM and power traces. She can prove 
that the watermark is inserted when she finds the high correlation peak that emerges for 
the correct key and inputs, as only the correct key will have the best prediction for the 
EM radiations and power consumption of the device. 
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Figure 6.6  Steps involved in Watermark Detection 
6.4.1. Software Watermarks: 
For the microcontroller, we have a clean setup for power and therefore found that 
the watermark could be detected with as low as 1,000 traces and we have tried to obtain 
the EM traces just by placing it on top of the microcontroller without any depackaging. 
We know that the number of Side-channel papers based on power is way higher when 
compared to the papers from EM side-channel. The reason is that EM analysis requires 
more traces and efforts but we have found that with specific EM probes, we could detect 
the watermark in 5,000 traces when placed on top of the micro controller and just 1,000 
traces when placed near the resistor if power setup is used. Figure 6.5, 6.6 and 6.7 show 
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the plot of Correlation for both Power and EM Side-channels where the different peaks 
reveal the different key bits. A positive peak means a 1 in the key and a negative peak 
means a 0 in the key. The design is such that different key bits are leaked at various time 
points, hence the number of peaks. The key bits are 11101001 for the 1
st
 slice of key and 
00100110 for the second slice and goes on for the different time periods. These are 
shown in boxes in the figures below. It could be seen from the power and EM traces that 
the Power traces have a very high correlation coefficient of 0.8 or 0.9 while the EM 
traces have a correlation coefficient of 0.3 or 0.4. We must take into the consideration 
that the setup is not affected by the noise in the case of power but EM signals are prone to 
noise from the other equipments and personnel in our lab. But we can still detect the key 
bits very clearly using the EM side-channel.  
 
Figure 6.7 Watermark in microcontroller detected using Power side-
channels. 
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Figure 6.8  Watermark in microcontroller detected using EM side-
channels with EM probe near the resistor. Key bits 11101001 and 
00100110 are visible from the plot. 
 
 
Figure 6.9  Watermark detected using EM side-channels on top of the 
microcontroller. Key bits 11101001 and 00100110 are visible from the 
plot.  
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In the case of Smartcards, the setup is made in such a way that although 
provisions have been made to accommodate the power and side-channels, both are prone 
to noise from outside sources. This is to mainly emphasize that the watermarks can be 
detected even if there are no custom boards and the only thing needed is the knowledge 
of the watermark, which is definitely possible since it is the owner and verifier who need 
to detect the watermark and they will design it. Figure 6.8 and Figure 6.9 show the 
Watermark detected at a specific time interval where the watermark key is being used by 
the assembly level instructions, and that only the correct key (watermark key/ unique ID) 
can give a high correlation peak. We set the key guess number 50 to be the correct key 
and hence a higher peak for the key guess when compared to the other wrong key 
guesses. This setup required 10,000 different inputs when power side-channels were 
used.  
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Figure 6.10  Watermark in Smart card detected using Power side-
channels. The top graph shows the watermark in the time domain. The 
bottom graph shows the zoomed version. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.11 Watermark in Smart card detected using power side-channel. 
The peak shows the correct key guess value is 50 
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The same procedure is done for EM side-channel but only with 6,000 inputs. Figure 6.10 
shows the watermark in smartcard detected using EM probes. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.12  Watermark in Smart card detected using EM side-channels. 
The top graph shows the watermark in the time domain. The bottom 
graph shows the zoomed version. 
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Figure 6.13  Watermark in Smart card detected using EM side-channels. 
The peak shows the correct key is the 50
th
 key guess. 
6.4.2. Hardware Watermarks 
For hardware watermarks we have used FPGAs where we have implemented 
designs that will follow the watermark model explained in section 6.1. We have used the 
same combinational function as in [47], a 128-bit secret key which we have set to all FF, 
and for the leakage generating circuits we have used 10-bit shift registers which uses the 
combinational function output as its enable signal. We have random logic before and 
after the watermark so as to provide a relatively realistic model of how the design could 
be in commercial products. We provide a number of different inputs from the Control 
FPGA and a trigger signal through a serial connection and make the Core FPGA perform 
the operations in the design and watermark and capture the EM traces. We then perform 
correlation based analysis on the obtained traces to detect the watermark inserted. The 
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following figure shows the watermark with secret key 128‟h FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF 
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF.   
 
Figure 6.14 Watermark in FPGA detected using EM side-channels. The 
peak shows the correct key is FF. 
 
We required 15,000 traces to find the watermark. Although the CC was around 
0.07, we could clearly see the watermark with the unique ID of all FF. With more number 
of traces, the CC could increase and mainly the clarity of the peak against the other 
incorrect CC will be better. That is to say, the incorrect CC will go down as we increase 
the number of traces as unwanted noise will get averaged out.  
In this implementation of hardware watermarking, we have connected the leakage 
generator output to an IO pin of the FPGA. We use a number of leakage generating shift 
registers but connect only one of it to an IO pin, primarily to give more signal strength 
and also to prevent our design from getting trimmed. When we do not use IO pins, the 
EM radiations created does not have enough strength for us to detect the watermarks. In 
this implementation we have made use of EM radiations from the FPGA and not the 
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waveforms at the IO pins as we have done in the Trojan implementation. So this is EM 
side channels detection for Watermarking. But we have connected the logic after the 
watermark to an IO pin so that the Xilinx ISE does not remove the underlying logic and 
in the process the whole design due to optimization. The Xilinx ISE checks for logic that 
does not drive or not getting driven and tries to minimize the logic. So in order for it not 
to “Trim” the designs and remove our whole design, we need some part of the design that 
is connected to IO pins or that drive logic that are connected to IO pins. All the other 
underlying logic and other instances of shift registers are prevented from getting 
optimized by the usage of “KEEP” property. But the Xilinx ISE did not allow all the shift 
registers to use KEEP property, as it then removed the logic saying there is no design that 
driving other logics.  
This implementation trick gives more EM side channel and also helps the design 
to get synthesized and perform what we wanted it to do. Although, this implementation 
trick provides an added advantage for the EM radiations as IO pins in general provide 
more EM radiations. So though this implementation uses EM side-channel to prove the 
concept of watermarking, it makes use of the leverage caused by IO pins. We must 
concede that this procedure cannot be followed in real watermarking systems as this will 
not be small enough to hide, as the attacker can sense there is a high radiating signal and 
can lead to him checking the designs for watermarks. In this sense this cannot be termed 
a real Side channel usage, but this makes use of the EM side channels and can be termed 
a prototyping model for EM side channel based watermarking. In order to move ahead 
from such a prototyping to a “real” Side channel analysis, one must make sure the 
watermarking does not use advantage from the IO pin. Future work can target this by 
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making custom boards as in the case of ASICs and also maybe depackage the FPGA chip 
as this will increase the signal to noise ratio and prevent using the IO pins. 
6.4.3. Comparison of Results 
In this section we compare how the EM side-channel fares against Power side-
channel. We consider three different platforms with varying levels of noise and 
interference.  
The microcontroller setup is specifically made for power analysis which has two 
PCB boards with isolation to avoid power noise sources. We used the EM side-channels 
available from the top of the microcontroller as well as a place near the resistor. From 
Table 6.1 and Table 6.2, we can see that even though the setup is made for power, the 
watermark can be detected using EM side-channels with the same number of traces 
(1,000), if the EM probe is placed near the resistor.  We can see that with 5,000 traces, 
EM side-channels can be used to find the watermark just by placing the probes on top of 
the microcontroller. This setup for EM side-channels does not even need decapsulation of 
the microcontroller (which drastically reduces the noise levels and provides better signal 
strength). We now see that the Coefficient correlation for finding the correct peak, which 
confirms the detection of watermark, is at just 0.3 to 0.4 for EM side-channels near the 
resistor, and 0.04 for EM side-channels on top of the microcontroller. This CC value will 
increase when de-capsulation of the microcontroller is possible. But it should be noted 
that the watermark can be detected with EM side-channels even with setups custom made 
for power analysis. 
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Table 6.1. Comparison of number of traces for Microcontroller 
Side-channel Number of Traces 
EM near resistor 1000 
EM on top uC 5000 
Power 1000 
 
 
 
Table 6.2. Comparison of CC for Microcontroller 
Side-channel Correlation Coefficient 
EM near resistor 0.3 to 0.4 
EM on top uC 0.04 
Power 0.8 or 0.9 
 
 
Table 6.3. Comparison of number of traces for Smartcard 
Side-channel Number of Traces 
EM near resistor 10000 
EM on top Smartcard 5000-6000 
Power 10000 
 
 
Table 6.4. Comparison of CC for Smartcard 
Side-channel Correlation Coefficient 
EM near resistor 0.08 to 0.1 
EM on top Smartcard 0.1 to 0.12 
Power 0.08 to 0.1 
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The Smartcard setup is not specifically made for power analysis. There is no 
isolation of power supply, which will help the power analysis.  We used the EM side-
channels available from the top of the Smartcard as well as a place near the resistor. From 
Table 6.3 and Table 6.4 we can see that the watermark can be detected using EM side-
channels with 5,000 traces, whereas the power side-channels require 10,000 traces.  We 
can also see that the Correlation Coefficient for finding the correct peak, which confirms 
the detection of watermark, is almost equal and in fact 20% percent more than that 
obtained from power. This is a setup with noise to both EM and power where we can find 
that EM side-channels perform better in terms of effort required. Regarding the hardware 
watermarks, we could find the watermark with EM side-channels but we could not find 
the watermark using Power side channels with the existing setup where we just de 
soldered the coupling capacitances.  
6.5 Robustness Analysis 
In this section we will analyze how secure the inserted watermarks can be. This 
can be known by studying the possible attacks that the watermarks can be subjected to 
and mainly what their vulnerabilities are. As we know, the watermarks are assumed to be 
inserted by the owner of the chip or design under test. An attack in this scenario could be  
 Removing the watermark from the original design 
 Hiding the watermark so that it can‟t be detected by the owner/ verifier 
 Creating new watermarks that can offset the original watermarks 
 The concept of watermarking has long been used for audio, video, and digital 
content. In such watermarks, there are four classes of attacks that could be carried out:  
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 Robustness Attacks 
In the case of image watermarking, Robustness attacks are those attacks that try or 
attempt to diminish or remove the presence of watermarks but try not to affect the 
original content. These can be accomplished by signal processing like filtering, resizing, 
and scanning, or analytic or algorithmic attacks like collusion attacks that combine 
different versions of the image to get a new image which inherently reduces the strength 
of watermark, making it difficult to be detected. 
 Presentation Attacks 
This type of attack is where the watermarked image or digital content by itself is 
targeted and thus there is no need to hide or diminish the strength of the watermark. This 
will help in fooling an automated detector by giving wrong information if the automated 
detector is specifically looking for the watermark at a specific place in the content. 
 Interpretation Attacks 
This type of attack is where the attacker can insert his own watermark and claim 
ownership. It will be difficult to find out whose watermark is original when both the 
watermarks have equal strength. This could again lead to argument, as there is more than 
one watermark in the same design  
The attacker could also try to insert a watermark that can actually perform the 
inverse function of the original watermark thereby reducing its strength and hiding the 
original watermark.  
 Legal Attacks 
This type of attack, as the name indicates, is mainly from the legal perspective 
and has nothing to do with the watermark design and insertion. These attacks mainly 
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depend on the laws of copyright and ownership, credibility of owner, and the attacker 
among other things. 
 In all the above mentioned attack options we can see that there has to be some 
knowledge of the presence, place, or type of the watermark for the attacker to succeed or 
it will very time consuming or impossible. So the first assumption is that the design will 
be kept secret by the owner and also small. Since this is the Identity of the IP that is in 
question, we assume that each company will be provided with different IDs/ keys space 
(so that many devices are watermarked). The main thing here is to keep the key/ unique 
ID secret. The other assumption is that there are no insider attacks. The watermarks will 
definitely be vulnerable to insider threats and can even be converted to become a Trojan 
as discussed in the previous chapter. This will lead to leaking out the secret ID which 
could be an IP breach, as this will provide the information to the attacker, who in this 
case is the illegal user who tries to copy the original design. If the attacks require more 
efforts and more time than that could be practically affordable, they will be called 
unbreakable in terms of cryptography. 
Considering the above mentioned assumptions, we will now look into the 
different methods in which the inserted hardware and software watermarks could be 
attacked or rendered useless. 
6.5.1. Reverse-engineering attack 
This is similar to the robustness attack previously discussed where the aim is to 
find the watermark inserted in the design.  
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In the case of software watermarks, we have the watermark written in assembly 
level language. In order to reverse engineer, the attacker has to find the watermark once 
she has access to the assembly level code. Even if the attacker has access to it, finding a 
set of instructions that perform a specific operation is very difficult in assembly level, as 
this is not as straightforward as in higher level languages, such as C and Java. Also the 
watermark inserted is very small. Finding a watermark that is of less than 10 instructions 
will be practically very difficult when the original code is very huge. The amount of 
effort required will be so high that it is not worthwhile for the attacker to reverse engineer 
the assembly level watermark.  
In the case of hardware, reverse engineering is a field in itself and is very difficult 
for an attacker, as it requires a large investment in effort and various special equipments 
are required. There are a series of steps to be followed to remove the chip layer by layer 
in order to access the design and wiring connections to know watermark location and 
operation. If an attacker is motivated enough and has resources to tear down the chip, 
almost any chip is vulnerable, but in general, the watermarks can be assumed to be safe 
against such reverse engineering attacks. 
6.5.2. Side-channel attacks 
We have made use of the EM side-channel analysis principle for a constructive 
purpose but the same can be used by an attacker for finding the watermark. But the 
problem for the attacker is that he does not know the secret key and leakage circuit which 
we have assumed to be secret and company specific. The attacker‟s aim here will be to 
remove the watermark once he finds it to avoid further problems from the verifier/ owner. 
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The attacker can find this by analyzing the exact clock cycles where the watermark 
operation takes place and can try to find what instructions they are and remove it in the 
case of software watermarks. For hardware, he can alter the codes only in the design 
phase or even change the watermark to become a Trojan so that it leaks unwanted 
information which he could claim as his watermark.  
Though side-channel analysis proves to be a possible option for an attacker, again 
it will require considerable effort for the attacker if the key, leakage circuit, and 
combinational circuit remain secretive and mostly small so that the side-channel 
information is not provided to the attackers without special equipments to reveal them. 
When the combinational function and key space are large, it is practically impossible for 
any attacker to find the watermark without inside knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
7.1. Conclusions 
In this work, we have made use of side-channel analysis (mainly EM analysis) to 
attack FPGA with encryption algorithms, and also used it for Watermarking applications 
for microcontroller, smart card and FPGAs. We have used EM side-channels to make use 
of the advantage of not requiring the resistor to be placed in the power supply path, as 
this helps in the automation of watermarking applications for a manufacturer. The EM 
side-channels will require just an EM probe to be placed near the chip in use and does not 
require any modifications to the supply path or the design under test.  This work required 
creation of setups for Attacks and Defenses using side-channel specific probes and 
hardware. We have made use of MATLAB for all the processing and supply of inputs in 
the case of microcontrollers and FPGA. We have also made use of C for the smartcard 
environment which uses Microsoft PC environment, WinScard libraries and functions. 
We have also made use of AVR studio for the codes in assembly level language for the 
Smartcards. This is the first time that EM analysis is used for watermarking and also 
hardware Trojans.  
What we have found out is that EM side-channel analysis, like Power analysis, 
can be used to attack secret keys, insert, and detect watermarks in both hardware and 
software. Although EM analysis requires more effort in terms of signal processing and 
number of hours spent in capturing traces and analyzing, it is pretty effective in finding 
out the secretive information and protecting them. We found that in terms of hardware 
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with noise interference, EM side-channels can provide equivalent and sometimes better 
results when compared to power analysis, which was evident from the correlation co-
efficient obtained from the detection of the watermarks in terms of smart card. Also, 
since this thesis was the first work in terms of actual hardware for our lab, all the required 
setup was developed and at this point provides setup for both smartcards and FPGAs.  
7.2. Future Work 
In this work we have made use of the near field EM side-channel information for 
both software and hardware watermarking and attacks. The main advantage of EM side-
channel over Power side-channel is localization, where one can use a number of very tiny 
EM probes that can actually touch or monitor the contact pins in terms of hardware. Due 
to time and resources, we did not focus on utilizing this property of EM side-channel and 
this is a possible future direction in terms of the work carried out here. Also the work 
here increments and provides support for the work carried out by power side-channels 
and is the first work with EM side channels in the case of both microcontroller and 
contact based smartcards. A possible future direction would be to carry out the EM 
analysis on contactless smartcards and RFIDs where EM side-channels can play a big 
role.  
This work concentrated on using only the side channel that is emanated from the 
design under test. Future works could possibly address the fact that the side channel 
information could be used for communication between two designs under test. Future 
direction could also try to study the usage of side channel information for 2 way 
communication and not just that is emanated. We could possibly insert side channel into 
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the design under test [49]. This could potentially lead to more security concerns. This 
would potentially lead to certain specifications to be followed while manufacturing 
hardware and implementing designs so as to allow (and reject)  information coming into 
the designs.  
In our group, we have been using passive analysis in all our work. We could 
possibly move into the direction where we could actively tamper with the designs, build 
equipments for fault injection type of attacks. This would require sophisticated 
equipments which could see through the layers of a chip. This would need a lot of effort 
and money to be invested, but would be necessary in order to specialize in all forms of 
security research. 
The setup used in this work although being cheap and easy to construct, is very 
basic and mostly not noise tolerant. With better resources and more time, clean custom 
setups for EM side channel can be used in the future. A possible direction is to have a 
separate lab space exclusive for side-channel measurements. Usage of a faraday cage 
could help in mitigating noise from the environment. Multiple tiny probes could be used 
at different parts of the design under test to obtain more information. 
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